Locke and Burke on Economic Inequality

The Enlightenment served as a catalyst in developing and promoting the equality of citizens before the state. A respectable movement in political theory tracing back to Marx and Rousseau has promoted the idea that political equality should be extended to economic life, and that de facto economic equality is a goal worthy of a moral, just, and progressive society. Inevitably this movement met opposition; more precisely, notions of property right and natural order had taken root well prior to any serious inroads by economic levelers and champions of social justice.

During the 17th and 18th centuries, the early resistance to social justice was therefore more defensive than the egalitarian movement it opposed. It sought to conserve and protect the existing order and the natural liberty and property of a nascent merchant class. Inevitably it needed to justify the established class structure in the presence of increasing economic inequality and the coexistence of blossoming economies with squalid poverty. Furthermore, this was a time of rampant egalitarianism in civil and political spheres. A defense of existing property distributions needed to distinguish between de jure equality before the law and de facto equality of result. John Locke's political theory developed in anticipation of this; Edmund Burke's developed in response to it.

This paper asserts that the political theories of John Locke and Edmund Burke both exhibit a defense of economic inequality and a vigorous resistance to efforts by the state to produce de facto equality of property. It also asserts that such resistance arises from two different premises: for Locke the right to property, for Burke an unyielding natural order. Further, their respective views on economic equality are rooted in similar yet distinct notions of political equality.

The issues to be discussed are important if we are to understand the foundation and complexities of ongoing resistance to the state's pursuit of economic redistribution. In many ways, such resistance has been divided between two movements whose intellectual roots flow from the political theories advanced by Locke and Burke. One is a vociferous and principled libertarianism (or "classical liberalism"), which adopts many of the rights-based arguments of Locke, and is advanced by Ayn Rand, F.A. Hayek, and Robert Nozick. The other is the more traditional conservative movement; while its focus on religion, tradition, and personal virtue often take more spotlight, in questions of economic equality it follows Burke's mistrust of intentional disruptions to natural liberty and order, and finds inspiration in Benjamin Disraeli, Russell Kirk, and quite properly Adam Smith. Comparing these two movements on the question of economic distributions is more practical in light of a comparison of two original thinkers who divide them on this and other questions.

The paper will outline the relevant parts of each theory in turn, but responses from each will be interspersed throughout. The political theory of John Locke will be discussed first, with a focus on the right of property, political equality, and how these are acceptably reconciled with respect to economic inequality. This will be followed by the applicable tenets of Burke's political theory, including his notions of natural order and the utility of poverty. Following these, a comparison between the two theories on the question of economic inequality will examine ways in which one or the other is more persuasive. The paper will then offer its conclusions.

John Locke claimed property to be a natural right. This right is derived from the property each man has in himself as a person and the output of that person's invested labor. "Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his."¹ Indeed, Locke was one of the first to develop a labor theory of value: "For 'tis Labour indeed that puts the difference of value on every thing."² Thus, all that is produced is the property of those who produce it, and there is no residual claim by the state. "As much Land as a Man Tills, Plants, Improves, Cultivates, and can use the Product of, so much is his Property. He by his Labour does, as it were, inclose it from the Common."³

Locke extends this right of property to the land upon which a laborer toils. It is labor which extracts value from land, and land without labor "would scarcely be worth any thing."⁴ Further, the appropriation of land by private interests serves more to benefit than draw from the common interest.⁵ However, the right to property in land is not unlimited; land withheld by the community for common use is to be respected as joint property.⁶

A more significant limitation to the right of property is that the first appropriation of goods or land entitles an individual to ownership, but only if this leaves "enough, and as good left in common for others."⁷ This caveat is what is known as the Lockean Proviso and has drawn attention in recent libertarian thought.⁸ It is intended to ensure that "the situation of others is not worsened"⁹ by one's appropriation of property. Certainly the prospects for enlarging one's property by cultivating new land were greater in Locke's day than they were bound to be as man reached every corner of the globe. While libertarians have offered many ways to think about how to address the Lockean Proviso, it nevertheless represents a snag in an otherwise seemingly absolute right to property in a world of limited land and resources, and it is a snag which grows in tandem with the growth of mankind.

The right of property is central to Locke's political philosophy. It is for the protection of this natural right that men abandon the state of nature and form political societies: "The great and chief end therefore, of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, and putting themselves under Government, is the Preservation of their Property. To which in the state of Nature there are many things wanting."¹⁰ However, Locke uses the word "property" ambiguously, at times referring to one's rights as a whole, inclusive of "Lives, Liberties and Estates," and at other times strictly indicative of land and possessions; as mentioned in the context above, it appears to include the citizens' lives and liberties in addition to their estates.¹¹ In either the stronger or weaker case, the right of property precedes and determines political association, not the other way around.

It follows from this that the state's power is limited with regard to property, as the protection of it is its ostensive purpose. In Locke's own words,

"The Supream Power cannot take from any Man any part of his Property without his own consent. For the preservation of his Property being the end of Government, and that for which Men enter into Society, it necessarily supposes and requires, that the People should have Property, without which they must be suppos'd to lose that by entring into Society, which was the end for which they entered into it, too gross an absurdity for any Man to own."¹²

The first sentence of this passage would appear to obviate forcible taxation as a means of collecting revenue, for surely if "any man" could withdraw consent and free-ride on the common benefits, many would. Locke attempts to finesse this point, as when he says, "'Tis true, Governments cannot be supported without great Charge, and 'tis fit every one who enjoys his share of the Protection, should pay out of his Estate his proportion of the maintenance of it."¹³ Yet this concession conflicts with the above passage, and Locke does not provide definitive answer to the question of how far the state can employ taxation to violate private property. He does claim that society's reach "can never be suppos'd to extend farther than the common good,"¹⁴ and that societies where one faction attempts to use government to invade the property of others are dissolvable¹⁵, but his lack of specificity in this area can be interpreted to grant wide latitude to a redistributive government, provided a majority is obtainable.¹⁶

Burke did not share Locke's pre-eminent appreciation of the right to property. While he believed in natural rights, he thought not that they are derived not from social contracts or human specification, but that "natural right is human custom conforming to divine intent."¹⁷ This resistance to a delineation of rights is a reaction to the proliferation of positive rights in the writings of the revolutionary French.¹⁸ Despite this, Burke had a healthy respect for property and expected its sanctity to be protected, not invaded, by the state: "it is to the property of the citizen, not to the demands of the creditor of the state, that the first and original faith of civil society is pledged." Further, "[w]e entertain a high opinion of the legislative authority; but we have never dreamt that parliaments had any right whatever to violate property …"¹⁹ The heart of his position is that the foundation of government is laid not in imaginary rights, but in practical convention and prudence.²⁰ His faith in human institutions transcends any notion of the inviolability of property or any other right.

When considering his approach to economic inequality, it is important to comprehend Locke's understanding of equality in general, i.e. man's political equality. In the state of nature, prior to the formation of civil society, Locke considers all men to be equal, in the sense that their power and restraint over their fellow man is not advantaged or disadvantaged by political force.²¹ This state of equality is abandoned when men join civil society. More importantly, Locke makes a distinction between this equality in the state of nature and all other forms of equality:

"Though I have said … That all Men by Nature are equal, I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of Equality: Age or Virtue may give Men a just Precedency: Excellency of Parts and Merit may place others above the Common Level: Birth may subject some, and Alliance or Benefits others, to pay an Observance to those to whom Nature, Gratitude or other Respects may have made it due; and yet all this consists with the Equality, which all Men are in, in respect of Jurisdiction or Dominion one over another, which was the Equality [of the state of nature] …, being that equal Right that every Man hath, to his Natural Freedom, without being subjected to the Will or Authority of any other Man."²²

That these other inequities in human achievement or virtue are considered to be "just" and "due" reflects a position that resulting inequalities are irrelevant, and that the only equality Locke values is the equal standing of man in nature prior to civil society. In any case, despite his renown as a beacon of equality, in his political philosophy Locke does not anywhere consider equality as a positive value to be sought, either in a political or an economic sense.

Locke's dichotomous respect for the equality of man in nature and respect for the inequality of any man's ultimate "precedence" is largely mirrored by Burke's thoughts on equality. Burke claims that "all men have equal rights; but not to equal things."²³ Among the chief tenets of Burke's political philosophy was the "conviction that men are equal in the sight of God, but equal only so."²⁴ Where Burke differs from Locke is in his tolerance for an inequality dispensed by the state, as in this striking claim: "Some decent, regulated pre-eminence, some preference (not exclusive appropriation) given to birth, is neither unnatural, nor unjust, nor impolitic."²⁵ Burke thus appears to favor those conventions and traditions of state which a man fears when he leaves Locke's state of nature.

Given Locke's view that the protection of property is the principal aim of a responsible government and that equality as a political virtue does not extend beyond the state of nature, we are likely to conclude that he would be rather indifferent to economic inequality. Yet while we should firmly base this conclusion on his considered views of property and equality, Locke does address the issue specifically (though with some disinterest). In his discussion of the increase in property through the use of money, he claims that since man has consented to the use of money in exchange for the useful things in life, "it is plain, that Men have agreed to disproportionate and unequal Possession of the Earth, they having by a tacit and voluntary consent found out a way, how a man may fairly possess more land than he himself can use the product of …"²⁶ The respectful tone in which he discusses the emergence of money gives weight to the view that Locke did not bemoan this development.²⁷ Indeed, Locke's discussion of property and money shows him to be a supporter of the idea that "[t]he right to acquire without fear of expropriation by others, even needy others, enables a society to increase its wealth to the point where there will be few if any needy, and make what few needy there are quite easy to cater to."²⁸ Locke did not view economic inequality as a problem requiring attention, no less so by the state; indeed, the formation of the state is intended to protect against the encroachments on property that such inequalities might engender.

Burke's political philosophy is not neat, deliberate, or even philosophical. It is not conducive to aphorisms, timeless truths, or manifestos. Nevertheless, it has a healthy respect for tradition, convention, and prescription. Above all, Burke predicates all politics on divine intent, as when he says, "[God,] who gave our nature to be perfected by our virtue, willed also the necessary means of its perfection.—He willed therefore the state."²⁹ Further, Burke had "reverence for the divine origin of social disposition."³⁰ There is for Burke a divine order to things, and we should be skeptical of efforts to tinker with this order.

It is natural for there to be differences in rank, in virtue, in wealth, and in privilege. "In all societies, consisting of various descriptions of citizens, some description must be uppermost. The levellers therefore only change and pervert the natural order of things; they load the edifice of society, by setting up in the air what the solidity of the structure requires to be on the ground."³¹ This was no less true in the realm of property: "The characteristic essence of property, formed out of the combined principles of its acquisition and conservation, is to be unequal."³² He praised the existence of a natural aristocracy under the full awareness that "men are unequal: unequal in mind, in body, in energies, in every material circumstance."³³ The inequality of man is due to his nature and ultimately to the unknowable plan of a God which a single human mind can not fathom, and should not dare.

Differing occupations obtain different respect for this reason. To call all occupations honorable disserves those that are truly honorable, for "in asserting that anything is honourable, we imply some distinction in its favour."³⁴ If there is no distinction in wealth, or honor, or glory, there will be no aspiration to these or other virtuous pursuits.

The acceptance of the natural order and appreciation for hierarchy and unequal gradations in our existence are central to Burke's reaction to the egalitarian movements of his time. They also provide a basis for rejection of rationalist reordering of human society to meet specific objectives, whatever the age or circumstance. While it is true that conservatism is a rejection of drastic change, and Burke also believes in this, conservatism also is a rejection of the external: plans and blueprints of human design developed to fundamentally reorder the human condition are inimical to a respect for what God and man have constructed henceforth. It is in this way that this kernel of Burkean thought has endured as a cornerstone of conservatism since.

Respect for the natural order is the plank of Burke's political theory that most directly confronts the question of economic inequality. Class divisions and differences in fortune are not to be rued, much less repaired. Charity is an acceptable and welcome practice, if it can be discriminate. The use of the state to correct inequality, on the other hand, is vile precisely because it is indiscriminate in practice and purposive in design.

Locke would not agree with Burke's respect for divine or natural order. This arises from a distinction in how each viewed natural law. "For Locke (as for Hobbes), natural law was grounded in our physical nature, and it obliged us to pursue self-preservation. For Burke, it was grounded in God's will, as understood through traditional Christian formulations, and it obliged us to pursue justice."³⁵ For Locke, man enters civil society to overcome the peculiar defects of the state of nature; if this results in collective action which changes the fundamental order it is acceptable to Locke if it is acceptable for the individual in pursuit of his interests. This is reflected in his view of how one affirms himself as a member of society. As each child comes of age, he decides for himself if the civil society in which he finds himself is right for him.³⁶ Such a decision would be a contrivance to Burke. It is too voluntaristic and contractual, for "the state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee … to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence."³⁷ The divine order, combined with parentage, schooling, traditions, and the like make an Englishman and Englishman; it is not for him to choose his society or government, but rather his duty to make due with England and its institutions, and when necessary to reform them.

It is not only a respect for the given social order that Burke would resist state efforts to equalize wealth. Burke, like others of his time,³⁸ sees hunger "as useful in motivating poor people."³⁹ Burke states this quite explicitly in the Reflections:

"For those purposes [wise men] think some part of the wealth of the country is as usefully employed as it can be in fomenting the luxury of individuals. It is the public ornament. It is the public consolation. It nourishes the public hope. The poorest man finds his own importance and dignity in it, whilst the wealth and pride of individual at every moment makes the man of humble rank and fortune sensible of his inferiority, and degrades and vilifies his condition. It is for the man in humble life, and to raise his nature, and to put him in mind of a state in which the privileges of opulence will cease, when he will be equal by nature, and may be more than equal by virtue, that this portion of the general wealth of his country is employed and sanctified."⁴⁰

Indeed, Burke would have accepted Leonard Woolf's assessment that "Christianity envisages a framework for human society in which earthly miseries have a recognized, permanent, and honourable place … it is impious to repine against them."⁴¹ These views are also echoed by Adam Smith in his tale of "the poor man's son" in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. The idea that wealth brings happiness is a "deception which rouses and keep in continual motion the industry of mankind."⁴² So much better for the deception to perpetuate than that the mundane truth, that happiness scarcely differs between poverty and wealth, should awaken us all to a life of leisure and grind progress to a halt. Burke also warns that the state's involvement in fixing social ills crowds out private virtue and morality, as when he says, "It is better to cherish virtue and humanity, by leaving much to free will, even with some loss to the object, than to attempt to make men mere machines and instruments of a political benevolence. The world on the whole will gain by a liberty, without which virtue cannot exist."⁴³

The utility of poverty argument would find Locke somewhat disinterested as a theorist. It is true that "in his published works he showed himself the determined enemy of beggars and the idle poor … because of 'the relaxation of discipline and the corruption of manners'."⁴⁴ Yet there is no evidence that he desired the continuation of poverty to further incentives. He acknowledged that the lure of inheritance empowers parents to have a lasting moral influence on their grown children; his analogy between a family and a society in this regard augments this example.⁴⁵ However, Locke shows himself to be dispassionate about this outcome, and does not favor or oppose it on any principle. He would most likely look to the utility of poverty with similar indifference. He was more concerned with what is an appropriate social contract given what the individual has to gain (and lose) from exiting the state of nature; promoting social goals or specific incentives was not a legitimate concern.

Burke also indicates directly how he sees the specific issue of economic inequality and the role of the state. Burke indicates that taxes should be essentially proportional, and benefits should not distribute equally, but rather should favor those who pay more: "He that has but five shillings in the [civil society] partnership, has as good a right to it, as he that has five hundred pounds has to his larger proportion. But he has not a right to an equal dividend in the product of the joint stock."⁴⁶ He spoke of a moral equality that transcends political or economic equality:

"[A] protected, satisfied, laborious, and obedient people, taught to seek and to recognize the happiness that is to be found by virtue in all conditions … consists the true moral equality of mankind, and not in that monstrous fiction, which, by inspiring false ideas and vain expectations into men destined to travel in the obscure walk of laborious life, serves only to aggravate and embitter that real inequality, which it can never remove; and which the order of civil life establishes as much for the benefit of those whom it must leave in an humble state, as those whom it is able to exalt to a condition more splendid, but not more happy."⁴⁷

This passage weaves the main strands of Burke's approach to economic inequality together. It speaks to the natural (or "real") inequality of mankind, determines that happiness in rooted in virtue rather than the correction of inequality, and expresses that differences in wealth between rich and poor are necessary and benefit both. Yet this overstates Burke's position, especially in contrast to Locke. Unlike Locke, Burke is not in principle hostile to a state role in reducing inequality. Burke simply sees the effort as unwise. For Burke, "How far economic and political leveling should be carried is a question to be determined by recourse to prudence."⁴⁸

As Locke is generally known as one of the great heroes of liberalism, and Burke one of the fathers of modern conservatism, it is perhaps too hopeful to expect that their philosophies would align to any considerable degree. "Burke disavowed a great part of the principles of Locke, the official philosopher of Whiggism … from among the general ideas of that philosopher, conservatism after Burke retained almost nothing but Locke's contention that government originates out of the necessity for protecting property."⁴⁹ Yet this last similarity is critical. That protecting property is the genesis of government is not only a contention of Locke's but arguably his main contention. Locke was certainly a liberal, but only in the sense that his ideals had yet to be reached; his was not an ever-progressive liberalism but rather one with a fixed end-point, one which has since been largely obtained. There is ample room to argue that since the mid-19th century, Locke's ideas have fallen on the conservative side of the ideological ledger.

Modern convergence between the classical liberal tradition of Locke (as embodied in post-war libertarianism) and the conservative inheritance of Burke, whether ideological or political, is built on a common respect for economic liberty in general and private property in particular. Indeed, right-of-center political coalitions, especially in the United States, have depended on this connection more than any other factor for their success.

The question of how Locke and Burke view economic inequality also suggests how they would approach the question of distributive justice. This is somewhat more difficult to perceive, since the use of justice as a concept in dealing with economic distributions was not common until the 19th century.⁵⁰ It has already been indicated that Locke considered man's natural inequality to result in "precedences" which are "just" and "due". But how does Locke see property and poverty with respect to justice, divine or earthly? On this question he clearly sees original distributions as just, and reserves to the discrimination of charity the task of aiding the poor: "As Justice gives every Man a Title to the product of his honest Industry, and the fair Acquisitions of his Ancestors descended to him; so Charity gives every Man a Title to so much out of another's Plenty, as will keep him from extream want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise."⁵¹ This naturalistic view of justice is echoed in a more general (less economic) sense by Burke: "All human laws are, properly speaking, only declaratory; they may alter the mode and application, but have no power over the substance of original justice."⁵²

As it has been argued here that both Locke and Burke are comfortable with persistent economic inequality, it is difficult to compare them from a perspective seeking a political theory which solves or addresses this as a problem. The more appropriate comparison asks, Who offers a political theory that is sustainable and inspirational in light of naturally enduring economic disparities?

Locke's social contract relies on a strict dedication to the right of property under majority rule. Yet while this argument is convincing to many, perhaps mostly to those who have more property to lose than to gain, it does not offer sufficient moral basis for the glorified standing of the rights to life, liberty, and property. Perhaps this is why these rights are so often compromised by the will of the majority: Locke bases his rights on the weak mechanistic notion of self-preservation rather than on a more developed ethical theory; as a result, shifting majorities are ever ready to dispose of these pre-existing rights as their needs for self-preservation feel thwarted. To the extent that nominal property rights frustrate these majorities, Locke's system becomes cold, impassive, and compromised.

Burke's political theory offers a more solid grounding in ethics. It offers positive reasons why we should proceed cautiously with redistributive schemes, i.e. that they would upset the proper, natural order and that diversity in economic life motivates us to work, to build, to give, and to be virtuous. This is more inspirational than an imaginary "right" to property. Burke's theory also leaves more latitude for exceptions and discretion, as prudence demands. As a result, it is less doctrinaire than Locke's, and thus more susceptible to vagaries and compromise. For rational political theorists this is a disappointment, but for political movements and actors (such as Burke himself) it offers more maneuverability and is ultimately more sustainable.

Both Locke and Burke developed political theories which find economic inequality acceptable and thus find little role for the state to correct it. Nevertheless, their theories arrive at this result from quite different paths. Locke's theory essentially prohibits the state from reordering society's class structure by standing on the right of property, which man leaves the state of nature and enters civil society to protect. Burke's theory is centered on the idea that a proper and just natural order is given us by God and does not admit rationalist schemes to equalize or otherwise reorder life, and that poverty has its rightful place in human life if progress, virtue, and morality are to flourish.

While both theories offer a defendable position on this question, it has been argued here that Burke's is more persuasive. While a strict interpretation of Locke provides a strong foundation for economic liberty by way of a pre-eminent right to property, this only indicates that economic inequalities must be ignored. Burke gives us reasons why economic inequalities should be ignored. His theory addresses the question less obliquely and with greater vigor.

With the emergence in the twentieth century of increasing inequalities of wealth and more sanguine efforts by governments to minimize them, the ideological response has been built on ideas such as those presented by Locke at the end of the seventeenth and Burke at the end of the eighteenth centuries. Property rights and political equality are core tenets of modern-day classical liberalism. A respect for naturally occurring distinctions in wealth and other measures of human well-being is fundamental to modern-day conservatism. A thorough understanding of these principles, as discussed by Locke and Burke, can serve to render more clarity to the ongoing debate about the proper place of economic inequality in political discussions and the proper role of political systems in addressing it.