Kant and Distributive Justice

If one asked the eminent philosopher Immanual Kant in eighteenth century Germany what he thought of distributive justice, he would most likely reply, 'Don't ask me! I am a philosopher … ask your local magistrate.' In Kant's writings, when one encounters the term "distributive justice," it is used to indicate the enforcement of laws, i.e. how justice is distributed.¹ This is very different from the modern definition of the term, i.e. how distributions are just. At the time of his death in 1804, the modern concept of distributive justice was yet undeveloped and only in the 20th century did the term acquire the meaning with which we are contemporarily acquainted.

Where does Kant's moral philosophy fit with respect to our modern concept of distributive justice? Specifically, with respect to distributive justice, do Kant's moral principles conform more to end-state theories or entitlement theories?² Questions of distributive justice are important because people who view that there is injustice in the distribution of goods or privileges, or that there is inherent unfairness in a social system, will challenge the system under which this unfairness arises. This particular question is important because questions of distributive justice necessarily rely on a deep grounding in moral philosophy; while one can rely on the explanations by distributive justice theorists as to the ethical standing of their ideas, it is just as instructive to reverse the reasoning process and take an influential ethical theory and induce what possible conclusions about distributive justice may be derived from it.

In this essay, I shall demonstrate that Kant's moral philosophy essentially adheres best to entitlement theories of distributive justice. This will be shown by elaborating the following ideas: Kantian ethics gives moral importance to actions, and as such is pre-disposed to entitlement theories; Kant's ethical principles are unconcerned with consequences and as such implicitly reject end-state theories; and two specific end-state theories, utilitarianism and Rawls' theory of justice, are not reconcilable to Kant. Following these, two possible objections to the general thesis will be examined to further delineate Kant's compatibility with entitlement justice. Throughout, the text Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals shall be taken as the sole authority on Kant's position.

Since Kant confers moral value on actions rather than consequences, it appears that Kantian ethics is not incompatible with entitlement theories, or that compatibility is at least possible. An entitlement theory can be described as one that "looks at the history of the situation, and evaluates on that basis … The resulting distribution of goods is irrelevant to this view … If goods were justly owned initially, and all later actions were non-aggressive and consensual, then the current distribution is just."³ An entitlement theory is oblivious to consequences. Similarly, Kant's view of morality holds acts in relative esteem regardless of their consequences. "A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition, that is, it is good in itself."⁴ Not only do entitlement theories concur with Kant's ethical view of consequences, but they also affirm Kant's ethical view of actions. Entitlement theories and Kantian ethics both derive value from actions alone. For entitlement theories, the value is justice-the distribution is just if and only if the transactions which produce it are just. For Kant, the value is morality in general; a rational being is moral if and only if the actions which he freely wills are moral. Neither looks to the character of the results or even its agent(s) but only to the actions themselves.

Entitlement theories claim that historical transactions (and thus the current distribution) are just if the transactions were consensual. Non-aggression is an important component in such theories. An alternative would be to remove this from the theory; the (modified) theory looks at the history of the situation, and transactions need not be consensual. Then, it might be supposed that the following is closer to what would be directly derivative from Kant's moral philosophy: goods and privileges are distributed according to moral merit, assuming this is measurable.⁵ But this leaves no room for morality whatsoever! If every action results in a favorable consequence directly related to how well one has conformed to duty, conforming to duty is not being moral. As explained by Kant, "in this case we can readily distinguish whether the action which agrees with duty is done from duty, or from a selfish view. It is much harder to make this distinction when the action accords with duty, and the subject has besides a direct inclination to it."⁶ Unless an act is done from duty without regard to consequences, it has no moral import. In this modified entitlement theory, it is impossible to separate duty and consequences since they never conflict. Furthermore, non-aggression itself (in transactions as well as elsewhere) appears to hold some value in Kant's ethics because aggression is an action which in most circumstances would be forsworn by maxims conforming to the categorical imperative. While it may be uncertain that Kant would necessarily reject a world with no moral opportunity, removing the non-aggression component to the standard entitlement theory seems to have a cost with no apparent gain.

Kant's ethics are reasonably compatible with entitlement theories of distributive justice, but how well do they fit with end-state theories? An end-state theory is defined as one which "looks at the distribution of goods among members of society at a specific time, and on that basis decides whether the distribution is just."⁷ In such theories, the ultimate determination of a just distribution is the structural pattern of the distribution itself and not the actions that produced it; actions can only be just contingent upon what they produce. Kant would reject this on two grounds. First, taking the characteristics of distributions as a standard for moral values such as justice is contrary to what Kant wrote:

"an action done from duty derives its moral worth, not from the purpose which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition by which the action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire."⁸

Kant goes so far as to say that skills rather than end results are taught to children since desired end results can not be known and are all possible.⁹ He does claim that "there is one end, however, which may be assumed to be actually such to all rational beings … which we may with certainty assume that they actually have by a natural necessity, and this is happiness."¹⁰ Yet even this one special end is not of moral value to Kant-the advancement of it he calls prudence, not morality-since ends have no moral import to Kant: "And thus the imperative which refers to the choice of means to one's own happiness, i.e. the precept of prudence, is still always hypothetical, the action is not commanded absolutely, but only as means to another purpose."¹¹ This brings us to the second ground upon which Kant would reject end-state theories. Kant would call any actions which strove towards end-state justice as hypothetical imperatives, i.e. "the practical necessity of a possible action as means to something else that is willed."¹² Categorical imperatives and universal laws obviously have no weight when the primary goal of an end-state system subordinates (or discards) constraints on one's actions in favor of end-state consequences.

Kant's view of consequentialist ethics and, by critical inference, of distributive justice based on consequences, can also be seen through the lens of the autonomy/heteronomy of the will. Kant claims that the Autonomy of the Will is the Supreme Principle of Morality and heteronomy of the will is the source of all spurious principles of morality.¹³ Here Kant seems to specifically admonish those who would attempt to find moral principles in results or end-states. "If the will seeks the law which is to determine it anywhere else than in the fitness of its maxims to be universal laws of its own dictation, consequently if it goes out of itself and seeks this law in the character of any of its objects, there always results heteronomy."¹⁴ End-state principles, even if freely chosen, thus seem to be red herrings for Kant, objects that may contribute to happiness and well-being, but not morality.

Of different types of end-state theories, utilitarian concepts of distributive justice stand to be least favorable to a moral philosopher like Kant. Not surprisingly, this stems directly from the differences of utilitarian ethics and Kantian ethics. Utilitarianism "is an approach to morality … that regards the morality of actions as entirely dependent on consequences or results for human well-being."¹⁵ A distributive theory derived from this ethical grounding can be differentiated from other end-state theories in that the particular end-state sought is utility (or preference) maximization. The following passage appears to be especially intended to leave no room in Kant's view for considerations of utility or consequence:

"Even if it should happen that … [a good] will should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing, and there should remain only the good will, then, like a jewel, it would shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add to nor take away anything from this value."¹⁶

For Kant, actions are good in themselves, apart from their consequences. For utilitarians, actions may be good only with respect to their consequences.

Another specific end-state theory worth examining is the Justice as Fairness theory presented by John Rawls. This is especially intriguing given the effort which Rawls labors to justify his theory with respect to Kant.¹⁷ Rawls claims that persons who are to freely choose the principles of a just society behind a veil of ignorance¹⁸ will formulate "principles of justice [that] are also categorical imperatives in Kant's sense."¹⁹ He reasons thus: "To act from the principles of justice is to act from categorical imperatives in the sense that they apply to us whatever in particular our aims are."²⁰ Indeed, Rawls goes as far as to claim that his thought experiment of the original position is the embodiment of Kant's highest principles. "The original position may be viewed, then, as a procedural interpretation of Kant's conception of autonomy and the categorical imperative."²¹ These defenses and perceived similarities do not, however, hold much interest to us with respect to Kant and distributive justice. Rawls' end-state theory is impure-it is somewhat of a hybrid in that an end-state theory of justice is determined to be just by necessarily using procedural means. It is perfectly conceivable that persons in the original position would choose an entitlement theory of justice instead of an end-state theory.²² This is as much admitted by Rawls: "One may accept the first part of the theory [the original position], but not the other [the set of principles agreed to], or conversely. The concept of the initial contractual situation may seem reasonable although the particular principles proposed are rejected."²³ It is precisely the part of Rawls' theory which is not end-state related (i.e., the part which is process driven) which Rawls claims to be compatible with Kant's ethics. Rawls does not attempt to square the set of principles he claims people would arrive at in the original position with Kantian ethics. It is difficult to imagine that Kant would swallow both; given the salience in Kant's thinking of the autonomy of the will and the freedom of the will, Kant would not agree to submit to a real world in which end-state goals trumped actions without regard to consequences, in exchange for an imaginary world in which the categorical imperative pre-justified our real-world actions. The claim that we would choose a world without Kantian ethics (where the autonomy of the will is secondary) in a Kantian way nevertheless discards Kantian ethics in the world in which rational beings actually exist and have freedom of will.

Does Kant's example of the selfish miser²⁴ indicate that he advocates equality of result, and by extension, some sort of end-state compromise? This objection would only be valid if three assumptions are met: (1) that there is no room for charity in a moral system based purely on actions, not consequences; (2) that the only method by which charity can be dispensed is through end-state distribution systems; and (3) that these distribution systems are compatible with Kant's ethical system. Let us examine each in turn. First, it is quite apparent from the argument itself that Kant raised the example precisely because he wanted to make it clear that charity is a natural action to take when actions must conform to maxims willed as universal laws. Second, the example does not mention government or forced coercion at all; in the example, it says of the person's response to the wretched that "he could help them,"²⁵ not that society could help them. Private charity is possible in both entitlement and end-state theories, and thus it can not be assumed that an end-state theory is necessary to provide for this. Third, the whole approach to the Formula of the Universal Law in particular, and to Kant's ethics in general, is individualist, not collectivist. It is doubtful that actions by society or its agents (i.e., government institutions) can participate in Kant's formulations. This does not mean that they have no place for Kant,²⁶ but that only actions by individuals have moral standing. While this is evident throughout the Fundamental Principles text, it is most explicitly stated in the Third Section:

"We have finally reduced the definite conception of morality to the idea of freedom. This latter, however, we could not prove to be actually a property of ourselves or of human nature; only we saw that it must be presupposed if we could conceive a being as rational and conscious of its causality in respect to its actions, i.e. as endowed with a will; and so we find that on just the same grounds we must ascribe to every being endowed with reason and will this attribute of determining itself to action under the idea of its freedom."²⁷

Therefore, it is only acts of private charity, not state-run redistribution schemes, which are moral. This does not argue that Kant would necessarily be opposed to redistribution schemes, but simply that they are not moral agents and are not necessary for Kant's ethics to allow for charity.

Kant holds that all rational beings have dignity and are ends-in-themselves; does this not demand some provision for end-state guarantees of welfare? Perspective is an important consideration in this objection. Both entitlement and end-state theorists appropriate a special and exalted status to the individual when discussing the merits of their systems. Entitlement theorists claim that individuals as ends-in-themselves have rights which are inviolable;²⁸ end-state theorists claim that individuals as ends-in-themselves are deserving of minimal provisions. While entitlement theorists view individual rights in a negative sense (i.e., our system shall not violate someone's rights), end-state theorists view minimal provision rights in a positive sense (i.e., our system shall guarantee us minimal life provisions). When Kant discusses the dignity of rational beings, he merges this with his Formula of Universal Law to create the Formula of Humanity: "act in regard to every rational being (thyself and others), that he may always have place in thy maxim as an end in himself."²⁹ Yet Kant takes care to indicate that ends are to be accounted in one's actions in only a negative sense: "the end must be conceived, not as an end to be effected, but as an independently existing end. Consequently, it is conceived only negatively, i.e. as that which we must never act against, and which, therefore, must never be regarded merely as means, but must in every volition be esteemed as an end likewise." This is to avoid confusing these ends (rational beings) with contingent, heteronomous ends such as happiness, which are not Imperatives of Morality.³¹ Kant's intent here appears to be to keep us from doing what end-state theories suggest: treating the idea of individuals-as-ends as superior to moral imperatives in our structure of moral principles. If they are not superior, individuals making demands against other individuals in violation of their rights appear to violate Kantian principles. Individuals not positively providing for individuals-as-ends, without respect to specific acts, do not.

In summary, Kant's ethical theory as presented in the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals appears to be an acceptable moral foundation for entitlement theories of distributive justice. Kant's exclusive relation of moral principles to acts rather than consequences parallels the entitlement determination of justice by gauging the legitimacy of historical transactions and conflicts with the end-state determination of justice by examining results. While some end-state theories (Rawls' in particular) have some Kantian elements, only those wholly separable elements of these theories which do not exhibit end-state properties are compatible with Kant's teachings on moral philosophy.

Although this examination does demonstrate a close alignment between Kant's moral framework and entitlement theories of justice, the relative merits of both remain outside the scope of this paper and are as debatable as ever. As Kant himself said, "We cannot, however, as yet say that we are touching the bounds of practical philosophy."³² Indeed, with respect to distributive justice, this brings us only to the beginning.